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 I. Introduction 
Economists have long been aware that a firm's cost curve for producing 
a given item may shift down over time as learning occurs~  The plot ofthe cost 
level against cumulative output is known as the learning curve or experience 
curve.  Our subject here is learning in an industry of price-taking firms with 
free  entry and exit.  An  arbitrarily large measure of firms with identical 
technologies compete in a  homogeneous industry.  Each  firm's cost curve 
shifts down  with its own  accumulated experience in production, measured 
by its cumulative output. 
The assumptionofa perfectly competitivemarketstructuredistinguishes 
our model from  much of the existing literature on learning-by-doing, which 
has focussed on monopoly and oligopoly.l H the average cost at any point of 
time is constant in current output, then learning introduces an intertemporal 
economy of scale that creates a natural monopoly. This need not be the case, 
however, if the technology displays sufficient decreasing returns. In that case, 
learning does not lead to a natural monopoly and is, in fact, compatible with 
perfect competition. Learning-by-doing is distinct from increasing returns to 
scale in this sense.2 
Our model is  not part of that branch of the learning literature which 
studies industries in which an individual firm's experience spills over to other 
firms in the industry (e.g., Arrow [1962], Ghemawat & Spence [1985], Romer 
[1986]. Lucas [1988], and Stokey [1986, 1988]). While the market structure in 
these models is competitive, the presence of learning spillovers gives rise to 
decreasing-cost industries as distinct from decreasing-cost firms.  We exclude 
·See Spence (1981), Clarke, Darrough & Heineke (1982), Fudenberg & Tirole (1983), 
Smiley & Ravid  (1983). Bhattacharya (1984). Dugupta & Stiglitz (1988). Jovanovic & 
Lach (1989). Mookherjee & Ray (1991). and Cabral & Riordan (1991). 
2See Mookherjee & Ray (1992) for a diJcussion of other differences between increasing 




i such spillovers, and consider only firm-specific learning-by-doing. 
Our point of departure is the model of Fudenberg & Tirole (1983), which 
considers learning-by-doing in a competitive industry with constant instan-
taneous marginal cost.  In their setting, learning-by-doing is incompatible 
with perfect competition, but we will come to a different conclusion, because 
we specify a different cost function.  We analyze an industry with the usual 
textbook assumption of increasing marginal cost, not constant marginal cost, 
and show that in a two-period model with a fixed  cost, a unique perfectly 
competitive equilibrium exists.  With no fixed  cost, on  the other hand, an 
infinite number of firms enter the industry, each producing an infinitesimal 
output, and no learning takes place; the possibility of learning is irrelevant. 
If we  make  the stronger assumption that costs are convex,  then the 
unique equilibrium takes one of two forms, depending on the demand and cost 
parameters of the economic environment. Whatever the environment, no firm 
can profitably enter after the date at which the industry begins.  In the first 
type of environment, all firms that enter remain in the industry permanently. 
The equilibrium discounted stream of profits is zero, but mature firms earn 
quasi-rents on their learning, compensating for their losses in the first period. 
In  the second type of environment, some ·firms exit, because the ma-
ture industry cannot sustain the original number of firms with non-negative 
profits.  Firms initially identical, facing the same prices,  produce different 
quantities of the homogeneous good in the first  period, and some of them 
will exit in the second period.  Relatively inelastic demand coupled with a 
strong learning effect gives rise to this outcome, which is an example of the 
"shakeout" that Hopenhayn (1993) discusses in a similar context. 
Surprisingly, the equilibrium is socially efficient whether it includes exit 
or not.  Even in the equilibrium with exit, a social planner would choose the 
3 same number of firms of  each type, the same quantity produced by each firm 
in each period, and the same prices as in the competitive equilibrium. Thus, 
the presence of leaming-by-doing implies neither the. usefulness of a  gov-
ernment industrial policy to ensure optimal learning, nor the useful el'ects 
of large, innovative monopolies 80 often attributed to SchumPeter (1950). 
Our model will uncover a pitfall that may exist for antitrust and regulatory 
authorities.  Although all firms  in our model are price-takers,  one possi-
ble feature of equilibrium is that prices are sometimes below marginal cost, 
sometimes above marginal cost, that profits rise over time, small firms drop 
out of the market and large firms expand even further, and that the large 
firms increase their profits from negative to positive levels without any new 
entry occuring.  This may set off more than one antitrust alarm bell, but 
government intervention is not only unnecessary, but possibly harmful. 
Section 11 describes the model and discusses its assumptions. Section III 
presents theorems on existence and efficiency of the competitive equilibrium, 
and  discusses the pattern of entry and exit.  Section IV characterizes the 
equilibrium under the assumption of convex  costs.  Section V  contains a 
numerical example and looks into special cases where  (a)  leaming reduces 
only  the fixed  cost,  not the variable cost of production, and (b)  leaming 
reduces just the marginal cost, not the fixed  cost. Section VI concludes. 
11.  The Model 
An arbitrarily large measure of initially identical firms compete to en-
ter in a homogeneous industry.  The measure of firms actually operating is 
determined by  free  entry and exit.  Each firm  is  a  price taker, since it is 
infinitesimal compared to the industry.3  Firms are indexed by  i.  Time is 
3Modelling perfect competition requires the use of a  continuum of firms, since each 
firm must exert an infinitesimal influence on the market. If  firms are of finite size, they 
are not profit-maximizing if they (a>  take prices as given, and (b) ignore the pouibility 
4 discrete, and the market lasts for two periods.  Firm i produces output q, (i) 
in period t, t = 1,2. 
Each firm  i faces the S&D1e current total cost at time t  88 a function of 
its current output q,(i) and its experience x,(i): 
C(q,(i), x, (i)), 
where x,(i) is firm i's cumulative output before time t, 80 that xl(i) = 0 and 
x2(i) =ql(i).  Let 
J(q., q2) =C(qll 0) +6C(tJ2, qd, 
where 6 E  [0,1]  is the discount factor, 80 J represents a firm's discounted 
sum of production costs across the two periods. 
If amount n of finns are active, industry output is Q, =1: q,(i)di.  The 
market demand function, D(P), is the same in both periods and is separable 
across time.  Let P(Q)  be the inverse demand function.  Define Pm  88 the 
minimum average cost at zero experience, so 
min
Pm =,~o  [C(q,O)/q]. 
Denote the minimum efficient scale at zero experience by  qm, so 
argmin 
qm  E  ,~o  [C(q,O)/q] 
Note that C(q,x) is a mapping from  R~  into R+, P(Q) is a mapping from 
R+ into R+, the partial derivative C, is the current marginal cost, and the 
partial derivative Cz is the marginal benefit from learning at some particular 
output level. 
We impose the following six assumptions on costs and demand: 
that their entry might drive industry profits negative.  Other learning articles which use 
price-taking finns include FUdenberg & Tirole (1983), Boldrin & Scbeinkman (1988), and 
Majd & Pindyck (1989). 
5 (AI)  [Smoothness] C(q,%)  is continuously differentiable on  R~. 
(A2)￿  [The Cost Function] Cf(q, %) > 0 for q > 0 and %~ 0; C.(q, %)  S 0 for 
all (q, %)  e R~  and C.(q, %)  < 0 for all (q, %)  e (0, K]  x [0, K], where 
K  is defined in  (AS).· 
(A3)￿  [The Fixed Cost] For any q > 0 and % ~ O,C(q,%) > 0; Also, C(O,O) > 
o. 
(A4)￿  [Demand Function] P is continuous and strictly decreasing; P'(Q) < 0 
for all Q> 0 and P(Q) -+ 0 as Q-+ +00 . 
(AS)￿  [Eventual Strong Decreasing Returns] There exists K  > 0 such  that 
the following holds:  if either ql  > K  or 92 > K  (or both), then there 
exist Q  and /3 e [0,1] such that 
(A6)￿  [Non-trivial model] P(O) > pm. 
Assumption  (AI)  guarantees the continuity of the marginal cost and 
,.￿ 
1  marginal benefit functions.￿ 
Assumption (A2)  says  that the marginal cost is  always positive, that 
greater experience never increases the total cost, and that greater experience 
strictly reduces the total cost of producing any amount from 0 to the amount 
K  where a firm  becomes inefficiently large. 
The total production cost, not just the marginal cost, is nonincreasing in 
the amount of accumulated experience.  Figure 1 shows one cost function that 
"Instead of C.(q,%) < 0, we  could usume that C(q,%) < C(q,O) for all z > 0, i.e., 
that the cost of producing a positive amount is lower with some experience than with no 
experience.  This would lead to a slight weakening of our characterization of equilibrium. 
(See footnote 6 below.) 
6 satisfies the assumptions- the cost function which will be Example 2 later 
in the article.  Note the increasing marginal costs for  any level of learning, 
and the decreasing returns to learning, for any level of output. 
Total  COltlOO 
Figure 1:  A Firm'8 Total Cost as a Function of Output and 
Experience 
Assumption (A3) says that there is a fixed cost to production and that 
positive production is always costly.  This assumption allows the fixed  cost 
to become zero even with a very small amount of experience, however, so it 
allows for  an approximation of the case of no fixed  cost except for  a once-
and-for-all entry cost. 
Assumption  (A4)  says that the demand  curve  slopes down,  that the 
quantity demanded goes to infinity as the price goes to zero (i.e., demand is 
insatiable). 
Assumption  (AS)  says  that if,  in  any  period,  output produced  by  a 
7 firm  is too large, it is possible to have two  firms produce the same output￿ 
vector at a lower total cost. This prevents the industry from being a natural￿ 
monopoly.5￿ 
Assumption (A6)  places restrictions on the demand and cost functions￿ 
jointly to ensure existence of a  nondegenerate equilibrium.  If P(O)  were￿ 
allowed to take any value, no matter how small, then the equilibrium might￿ 
be at zero output for every firm.￿ 
The six assumptions listed above are all that are needed for our main￿ 
results,  but with a  little more structure on  the model  we  can strengthen￿ 
the results further.  We  will do that in Section IV  by adding the following￿ 
assumption, which is not implied by (Al)-(A6):￿ 
(A7)￿  [Convex Costs]  C is convex; for all x  ~  0, C(q,x) is strictly convex in￿ 
q, and for all q ~ 0, if Xl > X2,  then C,(q,xd ~ C,(q,X2)'￿ 
Assumption (A7) requires the total cost function to be convex in X and 
q.  For any level of experience, the current marginal cost is strictly increasing￿ 
in current output. Assumption (A7) is sufficient to ensure strict convexity of￿ 
f on  R~.  Part of this assumption is that C~ is nondecreasing in x; that is,￿ 
there are decreasing returns to learning at any given level of current output.￿ 
Assumption (A7)  is not necessary for existence, uniqueness, and optimality￿ 
of equilibrium prices and so will not be used for Propositions 1 and 2.￿ 
51f  one thinks in  terms of multiproduct finns,  (AS)  requires that the joint cost of￿ 
production is no longer subadditive if the finD produces an excessive amount of the two￿ 
goods (see Panzar [19891).  Note, incidentally, that the crucial difFerence between a learning￿ 
model and a static model of joint production is time consistency:  in our learning model￿ 
we will  require that second-period profits be non-negative (or no firms would operate in￿ 
the second period), whereas in static joint production, profits on either one of the r;oods￿ 
can be negative.￿ 
8 
------~-------------------------------_.~ Our specification of the cost function allows a firm to accumulate experi-
ence on both its fixed and marginal costs. Each firm maximizes its discounted 
stream of profits, taking prices as given.  An  active firm exits ·the industry 
in the second period if its profits from that time on would be negative.  A 
firm  with no experience enters the industry in the second period only if it 
can make positive profits in that period. 
Ill. Properties of the Competitive Equilibrium 
Let Pt  be the market price in period t.  Denote firms that stay in the 
market for  both periods as staying or 8-type firms, with output qt  in 
period t,  flow  profit  ?rt,  and total profits of fi, discounted back to time of 
entry.  Denote firms  that exit at the end of the first  period as exiting or 
E-type firms, with output qE and profit ?rE.  Denote firms that enter the 
industry at the beginning of the second period as late-entering or L-type 
firms, with output qL  and profit  ?rL  in the second period (not  discounted 
back to the first period). Finally, let ns, nE, and nL be the measures of  active 
firms of each type. 
A firm staying in the industry for both periods maximizes its discounted 
sum of profits.  The first order conditions for  the firm's profit maximization 
problem are: 
PI = Cq(q},O) + 6Cz (q2,ql)  (1) 
P2 = Cq(qoz, ql).  (2) 
Equation (1) says that as long as learning still occurs, a staying firm will 
choose output in the first period so that its marginal cost is greater than the 
market price, since Cz (q2, ql) is negative.  In other words, a staying firm over-
produces in the first period in order to reduce its cost in the second period. 
As  a  result, a staying firm  makes losses initially in equilibrium, which are 
9 
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I counterbalanced by positive gains later. Equation (2) is the standard "price￿ 
equals marginal cost" condition. If the market ends in the second period, any￿ 
further learning is of no use to a staying firm,  80 a firm maximizing profits￿ 
from that time on chooses output to equate price to its marginal cost.￿ 
Marginal  cost  in  the standard model  is  here  replaced  by  what one￿ 
might call the Effective Marginal  Cost:  the increase in lifetime discoUDted￿ 
costs when current output increases, which for the first period is C,(qlt 0) +￿ 
tSC,;(q2, Ql)' A price-taking firm which maximizes profits in a dynamic context￿ 
chooses its output to equate price to its effective marginal cost in period 1.￿ 
A firm's effective marginal cost in period 2 is just its marginal cost.  Note￿ 
that the effective marginal cost com5 arbitrarily close to the marginal cost￿ 
of a non-experienced firm for sufficiently large Ql, because if a firm produces￿ 
too much today, its marginal benefit from learning becom5 almost zero.￿ 
An equilibrium should be characterized by rational price-taking behavior￿ 
on the part of firms, but rationality and price taking do not nec5Sarily result￿ 
in identical behavior by all firms.  We define equilibrium as follows.￿ 
Definition;  An  equilibrium consists  of variables  defined  in (a)￿ 
through (d) which satisfy conditions (i) through (xi) below.￿ 
(a) Measures (ns, nE, n£) of type S, E and L firms who enter the￿ 
market.￿ 
(b)  FUnctions  91(i)  and  92(i),  where  9j  :  [O,ns]  -+  ~,  j  =￿ 
1,2, qj(.) integrable (with respect to Lebesgue measure);  9j(i) is the￿ 
output produced by firm i of 8-type in period j.￿ 
(c) FUnctions qE : [0, nE] -+ R+ and 9L  : [0, nL] -+ ~, integrable,￿ 
where qE(i) and 9LU) are the output produced by the i-th E and j-th￿ 
L type firms in their periods in the market.￿ 
(d) Prices PI  ~  0 and P2  ~  O.￿ 
The variables defined in (a) - (d) must aatisfy the following condi-￿
tions to constitute an equilibrium:￿ 
(i)Pl =D(Ql+QE),Ql- C6 91 (i)di,QE-/o"B 9E(i)di(market8￿ 
clear in the first period).￿ 




11 clear in the second period). 
(iii) Ifns > 0, then (91 (i),92(i» maximizel [P191+6P292-C(9ltO)-
6C(92,91)] with respect to 9h92 ~ 0 (staying firms maximize profits). 
(iv) If  nE > 0, then 9E(i) ma,omiHl [P19 - C(9,0)] w.r.t.  9  ~  0 
(exiting firms maximize profits). 
(v) If  nL > 0, then 9L(i) maximizes lP29 - C(9,0)] w.r.t.  9  ~  0 
(late-entering firms maximize profits). 
(vi) 9~o.io [P191 + 6P292 - C(91 ,0) - 6C(92,9I>] SO (further entry 
by staying firms is not strictly profitable). 
(vii)  Af~'tz  [P19 - C(9,0)] S 0 (further entry by exiting firms is Dot 
strictly profitable). 
(viii) Affoz lP29 - C(9, 0)] S 0 (further entry by late-entering firms 
is not strictly profitable). 
(ix) Ifns > 0, then [P191 (i)+6P292(i)-C(91(i), O)-6C(92(i),91 (i))) = 
0,0 S i S nS (zero profit for staying firms, if  there are any). 
(x) If  nE > 0, then [P19E(i) - C(9E(i), 0)] - 0, ° S i S  nE (zero 
profit for exiting firms, if  there are any). 
(xi) If  nL > 0, then lP29L(i) - C(9L(i),0)] - 0,0 S  i  S  nL (zero 
profit for late-entering firms, if there are any). 
Conditions (vi) - (viii) ensure that there is no incentive for further entry 
(independent of what firms are already producing in the market) while (ix) 
- (xi) ensure that all active firms  earn zero  profit.  Conditions (vi)  - (viii) 
also ensure that no firm can make positive profit by behaving like some other 
type.  No S-type firm can do better by exiting at the end of period 1 nor can 
an E-type firm  make positive profit by staying on till period 2 (even if there 
are no S-type firms in the market) and so forth.  This also ensures sequential 
rationality on the part of the E-type and 5-type firms, who might otherwise 
find it advantageous to change their second-period behavior halfway through 
the evolution of the industry. 
In  an equilibrium with exit, an exiting firm  makes zero profits in the 
first period, and in an equilibrium with late entry, a late entrant makes zero 
profits in the second period.  A firm with no experience behaving optimally 
11 during the single period in which it remains in the market makes zero profits if 
and only if the market price equals its minimum average cost. The effective 
marginal cost of a  firm which  remains in the industry for  only one period 
equals its marginal cost.  A firm exiting in the end of the first period does 
not have incentive to overproduce in that period in order to reduce its costs, 
and thus increase profits in the second period. 
These requirements for rational and competitive behavior on the part of 
the firms imply a number of restrictions on equilibrium outcomes, which are 
summarized in Proposition 1. 
12￿ PROPOSITION 1.  In any equilibrium,  the price in the first period is at 
most the minimum average cost for a firm with zero uperience, and if there 
is exit in the  equilibrium,  the first-period price  uactl71 equals the  minimum 
average cost.  All exiting firms earn zero profits in the first period.  All staying 
firms  earn strictly negative  profits  in the  first  period  and  strictly positive 
profits  in the  second period.  If there  exist late-entering firms,  the  second-
period price is the minimum average cost for a firm with zero uperience.  In 
any equilibrium,  no firm produces output in the range of strongly diminishing 
returns.6 
In￿ the model's notation: 
1.￿  Pi  < Pm  < P(O),i = 1,2. 
2.￿  ns > 0, Ql > 0 and Q2 > O. 
3.￿  For all iE [0, ns], [Plql (i)-C(qdi), 0)]  < 0 and lP2q2(i)-C(q2(i) , qdi))] > 
O. 
4·￿  If nE  > 0,  then  QE  > 0, PI  =  Pm  and for  i  E  [O,nE],qE(i)  E  {q  : 
[C(q,O)/q] = Pm}. 
S.￿  If nL  > 0,  then  QL  >  0,1'2  =  Pm  and  for  i  E  [0, nLl, qdi)  E  {q 
[C(q,O)/q] = Pm}. 
1.￿  Either "lE > 0 or "IL  > 0,  but not both. 
11  Footnote 4 noted that in Assumption (A2), instead of C.(q,z) < 0, we could have 
assumed that C(q,z) < C(q,O) for  all  z > 0.  In that case Proposition 1 would require 
modification because it might happen that equilibrium profits for staying finns would be 
zero in both periods and that the effective marginal cost might be equal to the first period 
current marginal cost. 
13 11--
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Proof.  Recall  that Pm  = Min{[C(q,O)/q]  : q  ~  O}.  ConditioDl  (iv),  (v), 
(x)  and  (xi)  imply  that if in  an equilibrium we  have  nE  > 0,  then PI  ==  Pm 
and qE(i)  e  {q  :  C(q,O)/q  11:  Pm}.  Similarly, if nL  >0 then 1'2  - Pm  and 
qdi) e {q : C(q,O)/q == Pm}. 
Conditions (vii) and (viii) also imply that Pi S Pm, i-I,2.  From usumption 
(A6), we have P(O) > Pm and SO in any equilibrium it must be true that Pi < P(O). 
It follows that Q1 +QE = D(P1) >°and Q2 +QL - D(f'2) > 0. 
To prove part (6) of Proposition 1, it is IUflicient to consider the cue of the 
staying firms.  Suppose qt > K  for some t.  In equilibrium, a firm'l lifetime profit 
is zero, so 
for some a,  {3  in [0,1], using assumption (AS).  The rightmost expreuion, can be 
rewritten as 
[P1aQ1 +P2{3'l2 - /(aQ1. (3'l2)] + [P1 (1-a)q1 +61'2(1-P)'l2 - /((1-a)q1' (1-P)'l2)], 
(4) 
which is either zero or negative.  In combination with the strong inequality in (3), 
this yields a contradiction, so it must be false that qt > K  for some t. 
Suppose nE > °and nL  > 0.  Then, 1'1  = 1'2 = Pm.  This violates (vi)  since 
by part (6) of Proposition 1, Cl: < 0, and facing those prices a firm could produce 
Qm  in each period and earn "'1  = °and "'2 > 0.  Thus, nE  > °and nL  > °is 
impossible. 
Now,  suppose there is an equilibrium where ns =0.  Then, lince D(Pt)  > 
0, t =  1,2 in equilibrium implies that nE > 0, nL  > 0,  a contradiction.  So,  in 
equilibrium, we must have ns > 0.  This, in turn, can be used to show that Q1 >° 
and Q2 > 0.  Suppose Q1  -= Q2 = 0.  Then, QE > O,QL > 0,  i.e.  nE> O,nL  > 0, 
a contradiction.  Suppose, Q1 =0, Q2 > 0.  Then, nE > 0,  i.e.  P1 =Pm.  Now  if 
some S-type firm  produces q1  = 0,  it earns a 1088 of C(O,O).  On the other hand 
if it produces q1  -=  qm  >°(where C(qm,O)/qm =Pm  ), then it has a lower cost 
function in period 2 while the current loss is zero.  So producing q1 I: °cannot be 
profit maximizing.  Thus, 91(i) >°for almost all i e [0, ns], that is,  Q1 > 0, a 
contradiction. Similarly, Q2 - 0, Q1 >°is ruled out. 
From the first order conditions of profit maximization for 8-type firms it is 
clear that 1'1  > Cq(q1,0)  so that q1  does not maximize period 1 profit at price P1. 
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III Using condition (vii), we have that for all i E [O,ns],  (P191(i) - C(91 (i), 0)] < 080 
that (ix) implies lP292(i) - C(92(i),91(i))] > 0. 
Condition (iv) and (x) imply that if  nE > 0,  then fori E [0, nE], 9E(i) > ° 
and [C(9E(i),0)lqE(i)] ==  Pm.  Similarly, ifnL >°then for i E [0,nL],9L(i) >° 
and [C(qL(i) ,O)/qL(i)] == Pm.  11 
If  the fixed cost of production is zero, (i.e.  0(0, x) = 0 for all x), some-
thing not allowed by our assumptions, and if costs are convex,  then a firm 
accumulates experience only in order to reduce its marginal cost.  A well 
known result from standard price theory is that a competitive industry with 
increasing marginal costs,  free  entry,  and  no  learning possibilities has no 
equilibrium if the fixed cost of production is zero.  Loosely speaking, an infi-
nite number of firms operate in the market, each producing an infinitesimal 
amount of output. This holds true even if firms are able to reduce their costs 
by accumulating experience. 
There are two  ways  to understand this result.  First, one can compare 
the situation to joint production.  Imagine a firm  that produces goods  1 
and  2 jointly with cost function  1(911 92)  = C(91l 0) + 6C(92, 91)  and sells 
the two  goods at prices PI  and 6])2  respectively.  Note that 1(91l 92)  is pos-
itive and strictly convex,  and  that 1(0,0) =0 if the fixed  cost is zero.  A 
profit  maximizing firm  then chooses  outputs at which  the revenue  hyper-
plane, P191 +6])292, supports its cost function.  For those maximum profits to 
be zero,  the revenue hyperplane must pass through the origin.  The unique 
point at which a hyperplane through the origin supports 1(911 92)  with zero 
fixed  cost is the origin itself.  But then demand exceeds supply, and there is 
no equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates this in two dimensions. 
Second,  the  market  outcome is socially efficient,  as we  will  prove  in 
Proposition 2 below.  If  it is efficient, it minimizes the discounted total cost 
15 of production, and therefore minimizes the average discounted cost of pro-
duction for  each firm.  The cost curves are convex for each firm,  and they 
would  pass through the origin if there were  no fixed· cost.  A property of 
an increasing convex cost function that goes through the origin is that the 
average cost is increasing in output.  Output per firm  .hould be as small 
as possible, 80 the 80cial optimum would an infinite number of infinitesimal 
firms.  As a result, the competitive equilibrium would not be finite either; it 
would fail to exist. 
Thus, if costs are convex and fixed costs are zero, even with the possi-
bility of learning, the peculiar result survives that an infinite number of  firms 
operate in both periods, each period producing an infinitesimal amount. And 
thus, no learning ever takes place! 
TCIIII COlt s 
NO F1XED COST 
TCIIIIlteveaue 
q 
TCIIII COlt s 
POSmVE FIXED COST 
q 
Figure 2:  Nonexistence of Equilibrium 
Even  if an equilibrium were  to exist, it is not clear whether it would 
be socially optimal in the context of learning, even if firms are price-takers. 
16 In  equilibrium, initially identical firms  may behave very  differently,  some 
staying, some exiting, and some entering late. A socially optimal allocation 
would solve the following problem: 
The Social Planner'. Problem (SPP*):￿ 
Choose￿ 
(a) (ns, nE, nL): the measures of type S, E, and L firms who enter; 
(b) FUnctions ql(i) and 'l2(i), where qt  :  [O,nsl  -+ R+,t - 1,2, 
and qt(.) is integrable with respect to Lebesque measure, ft(i) being 
the output produced by staying firm i  in period t; 
(c) Integrable functions fE : [0, nEl-+ R.t and qL : [0, nLl-+ R+, 
where qE(i) and fLU) are the output produced by the i-th E and j-th 
L type firms, respectively, in their periods of operation; 
so as to maximize 
1[1 P(q)dq + 1[2 6P(q)dq - JORS[C(ql (i), 0)'+ 6C('12(i),ql(i))]di 
- loRE [C(qE(i), O)]di - 6Io
Rt [C(qL(i) ,O)]di 
where Yl =Ql +QE and Y2 =Q2 +QL, and 
RS  RS RE 
Ql =1 ql(i)di,  Q2 = 1 'l2(i)di,  QE = 1 qE(i)di,  QL _l
Rt 
9L(i)di. 
To maximize total surplus, the social planner is able to choose not only 
the number of firms  in  the industry each  period,  but also each individual 
firm's output each period.  In choosing the latter, the social planner equates 
each  individual firm's effective marginal cost to society's marginal benefit. 
But a social planner's choosing the number of staying firms,  exiting finns, 
and late-entering firms turns out to be equivalent to setting each type's profits 
to zero.  Furthennore, it turns out that in any efficient outcome the profits 
of staying firms are negative in the first period and positive in the second. 
Thus, the competitive market exactly reproduces the social planner's actions. 
Under assumptions (AI) to (A6), not only does a competitive equilib-
rium exist, but it is unique in prices and it is socially optimal. 
17 
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I PROPOSITION 2. Under GSsumptions (A.l) to  (.4.6),  an equilibrium ex-
ists.  It is unique in prices and aggregate output,  and it is  ,~11l  optimal. 
Outline of the Proof.7 Consider the social planner's problem (SPP), defined 
above. The problem can be decomposed into two stages: 
(i)  For any vector of total output to be produced by different S,E and L 
type firms, the social planner decides on the minimum total COlt of producing this 
vector by choosing the measure of active firms and their output. 
(ii) The social surplus from any total output vector can be written as the area 
under the inverse demand curve and the social cost corresponding to that output, 
where the social cost function is defined in stage (i). 
One can use a result from Aumann and Pedes (1965) to show existence and 
.'￿  characterize the social cost minimization problem in etage (i).  The minimand in 
this problem is  not necessarily convex  (unless we  l88UDle  [A7))  and there need 
not be a unique solution. Using the Lyapunov-Richter theorem, however, one can 
convexify the social cost possibility set generated by using a continuum of firms 
even  though the individual firm's cost function is  not necessarily convex.  The 
social cost function (the value of the minimization problem) is therefore convex and 
differentiable. This makes the problem in stage (H) a strictly concave maximization 
problem with a differentiable maximand. 
Using a set of arguments based on the fact that P(Q) -+ 0 as Q -+ +00 and 
that the social marginal cost of output is bounded above zero, we can ehow that 
there exists a solution to the problem in stage (ii).  As  the maximand is strictly 
concave, the solution is unique (in terms of total output produced by different types 
of firms).  The way the production of this output vector is organized depends on 
the cost minimization problem of stage (i). The inverse demand function generates 
a price in each period such that demand is equal to total output. The first order 
conditions for  the social planner's maximization problem show that the price in 
each period is equal to the social marginal cost of production if a positive quantity 
is produced and the price is no greater than sOcial marginal cost otherwise.  The 
social marginal cost (for each of the types E,S and L) is the Lagrangean multiplier 
for the appropriate social cost minimization problem in stage (i).  One can show 
that in any solution to the eocial cost minimization problem, each firm  produces 








1'1' output that maximizes its profit if  the Lagrangean multipliers are interpreted as 
prices. Furthermore, such profit is zero ifa positive quantity is produced and never 
exceeds zero.  One can then establish that every solution to the SPP is sustain&ble 
as a competitive equilibrium. Also, the way the total output vector is produced in 
equilibrium can be &bOWD to minimize social COlt.  Using the concavity ofthe social 
surplus in problem (H) and the first order conditions of profit maximization, one 
can directly check that the competitive allocation indeed satisfies all the conditions 
of social optimality.  Hence, a production plan is socially optimal if  and only if  it 
is sustainable as a competitive equilibrium. ~ there exists a solution to the SPP, 
there exists a competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, since the solution to the SPP 
is unique in total output produced, the competitive equilibrium is unique in prices. 
If,  in  addition,  we  assume  (A7),  the social  cost minimization problem in 
stage (i) becomes a convex problem, so it has a unique solution in the measure of 
active firms  of different types and their output.  So the competitive equilibrium 
allocation is  unique in output and measure of active firms under (A7), which is 
what Proposition 3 says below. 
IV. Further Results: The Case of Convex Costs 
Let us now introduce assumption (A7), convexity of the cost function, 
noting that (A7)  does not necessarily imply (A5),  which must still be re-
tained.  Earlier we saw that the equilibrium is unique in prices. When costs 
are convex, it is also unique in output and the number of firms. 
The case of convex costs is the simplest special case one might wish to 
consider, but it yields quite interesting results in comparison with an industry 
which has no learning curve.  In such an industry, identical firms produce the 
same output in equilibrium if the marginal cost curve is upward sloping, but 
when the opportunity for learning is added, identical firms behave differently 
ill the same equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 3. Under assumptions (AI)-(A 7), the equilibrium (shown 
to exist and be efficient in Proposition 2) is unique in prices, individual firms' 
19 outputs in each period,  and the number of  fifTn8. 8 
.  Convexity also allows us to be more specific about the properties of the 
equilibrium, as shown in the next set of propositions. 
PROPOSITION 4.  Under assumptions (AI)-(A 7),  the following is troe 
in equilibrium: 
(a)￿ Each of the staying fifTn8  behaves identically, and there ezists a positive 
measure of staying firms.  There  ezist qi  and qi  such that qi(i)  = qi 
and q;(i) = q;  for all active staying fifTn8 i. 
(b)￿  If exiting firms  exist,  they produce  at the  minimum efficient scale of 
a  firm  with no ezperience,  which  is  less  than  the ql  produced  by  the 
staying firms.  If nE > 0,  then qE(i)  = qm  for all i e [0, nE],  where 
qm  is the unique solution to minimization of  [C(q, 0)/ q]  with respect to 
q > 0,  and qE < qi· 
(c)￿  There  exist no late-entering firms:  nL =0.9 
Proposition 4 allows the unique equilibrium to take one of two distinct 
forms, depending on the cost and demand parameters:  (i) with exit at the 
end of the first period, or (ii) without exit. 
In  an equilibrium  with exit,  some firms,  after  producing in  the first 
period, decide  to leave  the industry.  Thus, two  types of firms  coexist in 
the industry, those staying for both periods and those exiting at the end of 
the first period.  Furthermore, firms that are identical ex ante nonetheless 
produce different outputs even in the first period. For a given price in period 
•An outline of the proof of Proposition 3 is included above immediately after Proposi-
tion 2.  The full proof is available in the Appendix.  . 
'The proof of Proposition 4 is available in the Appendix. 
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,  " 1, exiting firms will produce less than staying firms,  because overproducing 
to reduce future costs has no value for a firm that plans to exit at the end of 
the first period. 
In an equilibrium without exit, all firms entering in the first period stay 
in the industry both periods (i.e.  all are staying firms).  Firms make losses 
today in order to accumulate experience, while they earn profits tomorrow 
on their maturity. To break even, the present value of the future profits must 
equal the losses today. 
It is perhaps surprising that assumption (A7)  is needed to ensure that 
there exist no late-entering firms in equilibrium.  After all, a late-entering 
firm must compete with staying firms that have lower costs, and Proposition 
1 showed  that if late-entering firms  do exist, it must be the case that the 
price is Pm  in the second period, 80 1'2 =Pm  aDd  the experienced firms are 
charging no more than than inexperienced firms.  Example 1, in which costs 
are nonconvex, shows how this can happen. 
Example 1:  Nonconvex Costs and Late Entry 
D(p) = 40 - 3p 
0=1 
q2 + (4 - 1~)  lor X < 3 
C(q, x) = { 
q2 + (8/3~r-7  lor X > 3 
In  Example 1, the learning is entirely in the fixed cost. The technology 
is  nonconvex  because the rate of learning increases at x =3, but it does 
satisfy assumption (AS), because decreasing returns set in at a large enough 
scale of operation.1o 
IOThe  technology violates assumption (AI) because it is not continuous and difl'eren-
tiable, but it should be clear that the cost function could be smoothed without doing more 
than making the numbers less tidy. 
21 In equilibrium, ns = 10, nE = 0, nL = 4,91  = 3,92 = 2,9L = 2, PI  = 
10/3, and 1'2 = 4.  These prices clear the market, because 
D<PI) =40 - 3(10/3) =30 =ns91 +nE9E =10(3) +0 
and￿ 
D(P'z) = 40 - 3(4) = 28 = ns92 +nL9L = 10(2) +4(2).￿ 
The prices yield zero profits for the late-entering firms because 9m = 2 and 
Pm  = 4.  They yield zero profits overall for  the staying firms because their 
profits are 
71"1  + 71"2  =[Plql - (91 + 4 - fcfo») + lP292 - (~+  (8/3!C2-7 ») 
=[(10/3)(3) - (32 +  4 - 0» + [(4)(2) - (22 + (8/3n3)-7» =-3 +3. 
Think of this from  the point of view of a social planner.  In the first 
period, he  decides to introduce just a  few  firms,  so  that all of them can 
produce high output and acquire sufficient experience to cross the threshold 
for effective learning. In the second period, those firms cut back their output 
.￿  because further experience is  not so valuable, but this means that for the 
social planner to satisfy demand he must introduce new firms. 
Example 1 incidentally illustrates a  point that will  be generalized in 
Proposition 6:  learning can make prices increase over time, even though costs 
are falling.  This is because firms overproduce in the first period, incidentally 
driving down the price, in order to learn and save on their fixed costs later. 
The discussion so  far  has shown  that exit may occur in equilibrium, 
which makes the question of the efficiency of the market outcome especially 
interesting, because a firm  that exits seems to waste its learning. Can it be 
socially efficient that some firms enter in the first period but never make any 
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I use of their first-period learning?  Surprisingly enough, Propositions 2 and 
3 tell us that the answer is yes.  The unique equilibrium may involve some 
firms entering in the first period, producing a positive output and thereby 
reducing their costs, but then exiting before the second period. Their learning 
is wasted.  Propositions 2 and 3 say that this is socially optimal- a social 
planner would  also  require  that some firms  exit and waste their learning 
rather than direct that there be fewer  firms in period 1.  Social optimality 
therefore does not imply the kind of "rationalization of industrial production" 
that governments favor when they try to consolidate firms in an industry. 
With a little thought, it becomes clear why this can happen.  Suppose 
that the marginal cost curve initially slopes steeply upwards at some produc-
tion level if, so it is sharply convex, but that after a firm acquires experience, 
its marginal cost curve is closer to being linear. In the first period, it would 
be very expensive to serve market demand with firms producing much more 
than if.  Therefore, the optimal plan is to have some firms produce only in 
the first period, to keep  output per firm  low then, but to have those firms 
exit in the second period, because the diseconomies of scale then become less 
severe. 
A variable that will be important to the issue of exit is 9{x), the ratio of 
the quantity demanded to the minimum efficient scale when the price equals 
minimum average cost. Let us call this the natural dispersion, defined as 
(5) 
where 




I When the minimum efficient scale decreases with learning, the natural dis-
persion 8 is increasing in x:  loosely speaking, the market is able to sustain 
more firms when firms are experienced than when they are not. 
Proposition 5 gives general conditions under which there will be exit in 
equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 5.  Under assumptions (1.1)-(1. 7) and IlUtficientlll heavy 
discounting, iJ the natural dispersion oJ the industry is less with positive than 
with  zero  experience,  then exit will occur in equilibrium.  1J,  on  the  other 
hand,  the natural dispersion oJ the indust'll is greater with positive than with 
zero experience, then exit will not occur in equilibrium. 
If 8(x) < 8(0)  for all x > 0,  there exists 60 > 0 such that if  6 e (0,60), 
then nE > O.  If,  on the other hand,  8(x) > 8(0)  for all x > 0,  there  erists 
60 > 0 such that iJ 6 E (0,60), then nE =O. 
Proof.  Suppose not.  Then there exists sequence {6,}  ~  0 such  that for 
all  t,  if the discount  factor  6 = 6" then no  exit occurs  in  equilibrium.  Let 
(n"Pl"P2"qll,q2,) be the equilibrium  (with no exit) corresponding to each  6,. 
Now,  the sequences {pi'}, {qit }, i ==  1, 2 are all bounded sequences (the prices lie 
in  [O,Pm]  and the quantities in  [O,K]).  There exists a subsequence {t'} of {t} 
such that the sequences of prices and quantities described above, converge to (say) 
(pj., qj.), i ==  1,2. From first order and zero profit conditions, we have that 
PIl' =C,(qll', 0) +  6tC~(q2'"  qll'), 
1'2,' = C,(92",qu'). 
[Pll'qll' - C(qll', 0)] + 6,lP2,'92,' - C(92,"  qll')] =o. 
Taking limits as t ~ 00 yields 
pi  == C,(qi, 0),  (6) 
pi =C,(qi,qi),  (7) 








1 •  • 
From (6) and (8) we have that 
PI  -= Pm,ql -= qm'  (9) 
By the definition ofequilibrium, it must be true that firms earn uou·uegative profit 
in period 2 80 that for all t', lP2t'92t' - C(92t',qlt')]  ~  O.  Ta.kiug limits, we have 
that 
piqi - C(qi,qi) ~ O.  (10) 
Combining (7) and (10)  , we can lee that 
pi ~ Pm(qj),qi ~ qm(qi)·  (11) 
Since D(plt' )/ qu' = Dl.P2t')/ q2t', we have after taking the limit as t' -+ 00 
D(Pi)/qi == D(Pi)/qi·  (12) 
From (9) , 
(13) 
From (11) 
D(Pi)/qi ~ D(Pm(qi))/qm(qi) -= 8(qj)  . (14) 
But 9(0) > 9(qi) as qi = qm > O.  Thus, (13) and (14) contradict (12). 
Let us  now  turn to the case  where 8(:t)  > 8(0)  for  all  :t  >  O.  Suppose 
Proposition 5 is  false  in this case.  Then there exists a  sequence {6i }  -+  0 such 
that exit occurs in equilibrium for all i. Let (Pli,P2i,q1i,92i,ni) be the associated 
equilibrium prices, outputs and numbers of staying firms.  Then PH =Pm.  Note 
that {(Pli,P2i,qli,q2i)} is a bounded sequence, converging to, say {(PltP2,qlt92)}. 
Abusing notation, let this be the convergent subse9uence itself.  Observe that 
Pli =Pm =Cq(qli,O) +  6iC~(92i,qli)' 
Since C~(q2i, qli) stays bounded as i -+ 00, we have 1'2 =Pm(qd =Pm(qm).  (Note 
that Pm(:t)  is  continuous in :t.)  Observe that P2i  = Cq(q2i,qli)  and 80,  taking 
the limit, we  have 1'2 = Cq(92,qI) =Cq(92,qm).  Since 1'2  = Pm(qm),  we  have 
q2 = qm(qm).  Lastly, note that for each i, 
D(Pli) ~ ni =D(J)2i) , 
qli  92i 
so that taking the limit we have 
D(pm) > D(pm(qm)) 
qm  - qm(qm)  , 
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I which is to say, 8(0) ~ 8(qm), a contradiction. / / 
If the market conditions are tight for  firms  with. no experience,  only 
a limited number of them are able to enter into the industry.  Those firms 
overproduce initially in order to learn, thus suffering losses in period 1, which 
they are able to recover later as they become inframarginal, with lower costs 
than potential entrants.  If  '(x) > '(0), then the market can sustain more 
firms  with  experience than without experience.  If learning decreases the 
marginal cost more or less uniformly for  all levels of production, then we 
would not expect equilibria with exit even when there is little discounting. If, 
however,  learning reduces marginal cost more for high levels of production, 
then if there is sufficiently little discounting, it may happen that there is 
exit in equilibrium.  If,  on the other hand, '(x) < '(0), the second part of 
Proposition 5, then once firms acquire experience the market cannot sustain 
as many of them.  Then, if discounting is sufficiently heavy, some firms are 
forced out in the second period. 
To understand Proposition 5 in a different way, recall the joint produc-
tion  argument made earlier in  connection with social optimality.  Due  to 
strict convexity of l(qll q2),  given PI  =  Pm,  there exists a unique price in 
the market in period 2 such that a price taking firm  who maximizes profits 
breaks even.  The market in  period 2 fails  to sustain all those firms  who 
become experienced by producing in period 1.  The only way to reduce the 
number of firms entering in the first  period is by  increasing PI. But this is 
impossible.  Note that the equilibrium number of staying firms is given by 
D~)/Q2.  Then the additional demand in period 1, i.e.  D(pm) - [D0>2)/Q2]ql 
will be served by exiting firms each producing qm(O). 
Proposition 5 has implications for  the important special case in which 
the marginal cost of production shifts down uniformly with experience: 
C(q,x) = C,,(q) +  q<l>(z) +  F(z). 
26 (Note that this specification also allows the fixed cost to fall with learning.) 
The function 9m(x) is decreasing in x for this case, so F'(x) < 0 and C'(x) < 0 
for x E [0, K], and 6(x) > 6(0) 80 Proposition 5 can be applied. Exit will not 
occur in equilibrium, if discounting is sufficiently heavy.ll 
Suppose, on the other hand, that learning reduces only the fixed  cost. 
Then the minimum efficient scale decreases with experience, and 80 6(x) > 
6(0) for all x, yielding Proposition 6. 
PROPOSITION 6.  If learning reduces only the fized cost, then in equi-
librium there is no exit, the price rises and each firm's output falls over time: 
nE = O,Pl < 1'2,  and 91  > 92· 
This is the price path illustrated in Example 1.  Effective marginal cost 
is  always  lower  than the marginal cost of any experienced firm  if learning 
reduces fixed  cost alone.  Thus, if PI  > 1'2,  then  91  > 92,  which contradicts 
the market equilibrium condition if later entry is impossible. Exit then does 
not occur because PI < P2 S Pm.  Thus, nE =O.  As we have seen, we cannot 
draw general conclusions about the properties of the price path, because it 
depends on the initial costs, the type and intensity of learning, the market 
demand, and the discount rate.  The same is true for  the quantity path of 
staying firms. 
11 The proof of the fact that qm (z) is decreasing in z is as follows.  qm (z) is defined by 
equating marginal to average cost, i.e.  C~(qm(z))+~(z) =CIIJ!T!jll  +~(z)+  :'({2). This 
yields  C~(qm(z))qm(Z)  - Cv(qm(Z)) =F(z). Since Cv  is strictly convex,  C~(q)q - Cv(q) 
is strictly increasing in q.  If  F is decreasing in z, then ZI > Z2 implies qm(ZI) S qm(Z2) 
and then 9(z) > 9(0). 
27 Environments in which the equilibrium has exit are fully,  if less intu-
itively, characterized in Proposition 7. 
PROPOSITION 7.  The following are nece88a~ and sufficient conditions 
for an equilibrium to  have ezit.  Let (qi, q;)  be  the lolution to  the following 
minimization problem: 
Under assumptions (Al)-(A 7),  an equilibrium with nE> 0 ezists if and only 
if 
[D(Pm)/D(z)] > [9i/qi]. 
Furthe'l'Tnore, if  there exists an equilibrium with ezit then P2 =Z,91 =9i, 92 = 
Q2, nE = [D(pm) - nsQi]/9m' 
Proof.  We know  that if exit occurs iD equilibrium then PI  - Pm  .  Consider 
the following minimization problem: 
It can be checked that there is a unique interior solution, say,  (9i, 9i).  Let z be 
the value of the minimization problem. Then, one can easily check that: 
Pm91 + z692 - C(91l0) - C(92,9}) SO  Itn' all  (91,92) 
Pm9i + z692 - C(9i,  0) - C(92, 9i) = O. 
Thus, the maximum profit earned by 8-type firms is exactly zero if  PI  - Pm  and 
P2  = z.  So,  in equilibrium with exit, P2  =  z  and each  firm produces (9i,92). 
Let ns =D(z)/92'  If there is an equilibrium with exit, then ns9i < D(Pm) and 
nS92 =D(z), so that 
(15) 
Thus,  (15)  is  a necessary condition for  an equilibrium with exit.  Now,  IUppose 
(15)  holds.  Let nE = [D(Pm)  - ns9i]/9m  > O.  It is easy to check  that (PI  = 
Pm,P2 =z,ns =nS,nE =nE > 0,91 =9i,92 - 9i,9E = 9m) is an equilibrium. 
/I 
28 Consider any cost function C and the minimization problem indicated 
in the statement of Proposition 7.  By definition of the minimum, it must be 
true that at prices PI =Pm and P2 =z, the firm can earn at most zero profit 
by producing in both periods. Obviously, z <  Pm.  Furthermore, check that 
the solution (qi, qi)  to this minimization problem is also a solution to the 
profit maximization problem of a staying firm facing prices (PI =Pm, P2 =z). 
The numbers z, qi, and qi depend only on the cost function and have nothing 
to do with market demand.  The proposition indicates that if qi > q2,  there 
does  not exist  any downward  sloping market demand function  for  which 
exit occurs in equilibrium.  On the other hand, if qi  < qi,  exit occurs in 
equilibrium for any demand function D which satisfies 
This is a restriction on the behaviour of the demand function at only two 
specific prices.  Thus, for such cost functions the class of demand functions 
for which exit occurs in equilibrium is  "large."  The lower qi is relative to q2' 
the larger the class of demand functions for which exit occurs. 
V. Examples and Implications 
Earlier we  found  two types of equilibria under convex costs:  with and 
without exit.  Under what cost and demand parameters will an equilibrium 
with exit arise?  Example 2 helps develop some intuition for what may haIr 
pen. In it, if the demand function is somewhat inelastic, then after the active 
firms reduce their costs in the first period by learning, their potential second-




I Example 2:  Industry Dynamics Under Different Demand Parameters 
D(p) = 20-bp 
0=0.9.￿ 
C(q, x) = «/(1 + e-:r) + 10￿ 
Table 1 shows the equilibrium in Example 2 for two different values of 
the demand parameter, b. 
If b =1.3, demand is weaker, and more elastic for  prices with positive 
demand.  In  this case,  there  is  no  exit in equilibrium.  All  firms  behave 
identically, producing higher output in  the second  period than in  the first 
because of the reduction in costs from  learning.  Prices fall,  for  the same 
reason.  Overall profits are zero, but they are negative in the first period and 
positive in the second period. The losses in the first period can be seen as the 
cost of learning, and the profits in  the second period are quasi-rents on the 
acquired learning.  Even  though second-period profits are positive, no entry 
occurs, because an entrant would face higher costs, having never learned how 
to produce cheaply. 
If b =1, demand is stronger, and less elastic for prices below 20/1.3. In 
this case, there is exit in equilibrium. The qualitative features of the staying 
firms are the same as when b = 1.3:  output rises, prices fall, and profits go 
from  negative to positive over time.  \Vhen  b = 1,  however,  there are also 
exiting firms  in  the market.  These firms  operate only in  the first  period, 
during which  they have  zero  profits,  instead of the negative profits of the 
staying firms.  Their higher profits arise because their outputs are smaller, 
but that means they acquire less learning than the staying finns, and cannot 
compete profitably in the second period. The "shakeout" which is the subject 
of Hopenhayn (1993) has occurred. 
30 TABLE 1:￿ 
THE EQUILIBRIUM IN EXAMPLE 2￿ 
Demand parameter b:  1 (strong, inelastic)  1.3 (weak, elasticY 
Type of equilibrium  Ezit  No Ezit 
Prices  (Pl,P2)  8.94.  6.63  8.76,6.78 
Industry output  (QJ,Q2)  (11.05, 13.38)  (8.60, 11.20) 
Number of staying firms  (ns)  4.40  3.60 
Number of exiting firms  (nE)  0.18  0 
Staying-firm outputs  (qJ,q2)  (2.42, 3.04)  (2.39, 3.11) 
Exiting-firm outputs  (qE,O)  (2.24,0 )  -
Staying-firm profits  (7I'J, 71'2, IT)  (-0.068, 0.076, 0 )  (-0.478,0.531,0) 
Exiting-firm profits  (7I'E)  0  -
Learning and Concentration 
Does learning-by-doing increase industry concentration?  In  an imper-
fectly competitive context, and without any learning in fixed costs, Dasgupta 
& Stiglitz (1988, p.  247)  say that, "...  firm-specific learning encourages the 
growth  of industrial concentration...  Strong learning possibilities, coupled 
with vigorous competition among rivals, ensures that history matters..."  Yet 
Lieberman (1982, p.  886) could find no systematic relation between learning 
by doing and industry concentration. 
\Ve have already found that history matters, even without the Dasgupta-
Stiglitz assumption of initial asymmetries, but Example 3 will show that the 
possibility of learning by doing can either increase or reduce concentration, 
depending on  the particular industry.  Empirical predictions must take into 
account the type of learning, not just the presence of learning. 
31 Example 3:  Industry Concentration 
D(P) =IIp 
0= 0.9. 
C(q,x) =q'l(x +  l)-k~.eri.".  + (x +  1)-k~/i.'''' 
where k represents the speed of learning, for  0 < k < 1,  and  ~..f'iG6le 
and A/izetl each take the value 0 or 1 to represent whether learning occurs in 
variable costs or fixed  costs. 
Let  us  denote as  case (a)  the case of learning in  variable costs alone, 
where  AtloMoble  =  1 and  A/izetl =  O.  Let  us denote as  case (b)  the case of 
learning in fixed  costs alone, where Atlo"ioble = 0 and  ~/iced = 1. 
In  both cases  (a)  and  (b),  if k =0 there is  no learning and the cost 
function reduces to C(q, x) =q'l + I and the equilibrium number of firms is 
n =0.5.  As k increases, learning-by-doing becomes stronger. The difference 
between the two cost functions is that in (a)  learning affects only marginal 
cost, whereas in  (b) it only affects the fixed  cost. 
Although n =0.5  when  k =0,  when  k =0.5, the number of firms  is 
0.469 in case (a)  and 0.553 in case  (b).  Thus,  ~f learning influences mainly 
the marginal cost, it results in fewer and bigger firms, but if it reduces mainly 
the fixed  cost it results in more and smaller firms.  These are the results one 
would expect from simple price theory. 
Further, as the speed of learning increases, industry concentration in-
creases in case (a) and decreases in case (b).  Finally, in both cases, consumers 
are enjoying lower prices as the speed of learning increases.  The number of 
finns is  greater in  an  industry with learning on  fixed  cost alone, however, 
than in an industry with no learning possibilities.  Given that 1'2 < Pm,  and 
that 1'2 equals marginal cost (the same for all experience levels), we have that 
32 q2 < qm'  Hence, because no firm exits, the number of firms in the industry 
is n = D~)/~ > D(pm)/qm, which is the number of firms in an industry 
with no learning possibilities. 
Antitrust authorities may learn an additional lesson from  this model. 
Consider the following scenario, which is possible for a wide range of param-
eters.  In the first period, big firms and small firms operate and charge high 
prices.  In  the second period, the big firms all reduce their prices, the small 
firms go out of business, unable to compete, and the big firms start earning 
strictly positive profits.  An antitrust authority might look at this and infer 
predatory pricing.  It is not; the big firms earn zero profits viewed ex ante, 
and the price drop is not strategic, but rather a consequence of falling costs. 
The exit of the small firms is socially optimal, and any punishment imposed 
on  the big finns,  or treble damages given to the small firms would reduce 
welfare. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
:.r  When so much of the teaching that microeconomic theorists do involves 
perfectly competitive partial equilibrium it is  curious that so much of our 
research has focussed on imperfect competition. 'Perfectly competitive partial 
equilibrium is by no means a closed subject, and there is more to be learned 
even about the models we teach our beginning students and use in everyday 
analysis. In particular, we still need a theory of endogenous market structure: 
why do finns in an industry behave differently at different points in its history, 
and why at anyone time is heterogenous behavior observed? 
One line of research, exemplified by  Hopenhayn (1992, 1993), looks at 
the evolution of an industry in which firms encounter heterogeneous produc-
tivity shocks.  Such shocks can explain why industries evolve over time, and 
33 why so much heterogeneity is observed even when firms are price takers and 
entry is free.  We have come to the same general result that industries evolve 
and that firms  behave heterogeneously, but for  different reasons, and in a 
fully deterministic setting, but one with learning. 
Our central purpose in this article has been to show that learning and 
perfect competition are easily compatible, and that learning has curious im-
plications for the evolution of a competitive industry.  We have shown that 
in  the presence of convex learning, firms must enter at the beginning of an 
industry or never,  and  that the number of firms  may decline predictably 
over time.  Firms may behave differently even though they all begin with the 
same production opportunities. Some firms may enter at a small scale know-
ing full  well that they will be forced  to exit later; and these firms,  in fact, 
will initially be the most profitable in the industry. Whether the equilibrium 
contains such firms or not, it will contain other firms which  make losses in 
the first  period and profits in  the second.  Viewing the situation from  the 
second period, it may appear oligopolistic, because these firms will then be 
earning positive profits yet no entry will occur. Viewed from the start of the 
industry, however,  these firms are merely reaping the returns to their early 
investments in learning, investments which potential entrants have not made. 
This model has been quite general in some ways, but It is limited in oth-
ers, and opportunities abound for extending the model. The main limitation 
of this model has heen its restriction to two periods.  By this simplification, 
we  have been able to employ general cost and demand functions.  Allowing 
such  general functions is important in  this context,  because industry evo-
lution can he different depending on  the curvature of these functions.  To 
specify linear demand, marginal costs, and learning would he to run the dan-
ger of missing important phenomena, something we  conjecture is not true 
of limiting the model to two  periods.  The other limitation of the model is 
34 the assumption of convex costs used for the later propositioDS; in particular, 
the assumption that diminishing returns in learning and static production 
are greater than the effect of learning on marginal cost.  This is certainly 
a  reasonable case to consider, but it is not the only case.  Convexity was 
not needed, however,  to prove the existence, uniqueness, and optimality of 
equilibrium prices. Moreover, it is remarkable that the industry dynamics of 
entry and output are so rich even under convex costs; if the cost functioDS 
are less constrained, we would of course expect even more surprising results 
to be possible. 
We have also shown that the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal. 
Learning does not necessarily destroy this conclusion of basic price theory. 
Even if the equilibrium involves some firms exiting early and not making use 
of the learning they acquired in the first period, this is socially optimal. This 
contrasts sharply with learning models which  assume that marginal cost is 
constant in current output, because in those models the social planner would 
specify that the industry be a monopoly.  Here, using standard V-shaped cost 
curves, monopoly is not optimal and no intervention is needed. 
35 
'1--Appendix 
One of the implications of assumption (A5) is that the minimum one-period 
average cost with no learning, pm, is attained at some finite positive output level. 
This is part of a more general lemma: 
LEMMA I. Under assumptions (AI) - (A5), the functions [O(q, O)/q], [f(q, O)/q] 
and [/(0, q)/q] attain their minima at finite positive output levels. 
PROOF. First note that since 0(0,0) > 0, the average costs in the statement 
of the lemma diverge to +00 as q -+ O. 
Let ml  = in/{[/(q, O)/q]  : q ~  Ol}.  Suppose the infunum is not attained at 
any finite  q.  Then, there exists {qn}  -+  +00  such that /(qn,O)/qn  -+  ml  and, 
further, for each n, 
(16) 
There exists N such that qn  > K  for all n  ~  N. Then, using (A5), for each n  ~ N, 
there exists z < qn, y < qn  such that z + y =qn  and:  f(qn,O)  > f(z,O) + fey, 0), 
that is, 
/(qn,O)/qn > [z/(z + y)][/(:, 0)/:] + [y/(: +1/)][/(1/, O)/y] 
~  [z/(z + y)][/(qn,O)/qn] + [y/(z + 1/)][/(qn,O)/qn] = /(qn,O)/qn, 
(using (16)), a contradiction. 
A similar method can be used to show that /(O,q)/q attains its minimum at 
a finite positive output.  Lastly, note that (AS)  implies that for any q > K, there 
exists z, y ~  0, z + Y S q, 
0(0,0) + 60(q, 0) > 20(0,0) + 60(:,0) + 60(1/,0) 
which implies 
O(q,O) > O(z,O) + 0(1/,0) 
Again, the same set of steps can be replicated to show that [O(q,O)/q] attains its 
minimum at a finite positive level.  / / 
PROPOSITION 2.  Under assumptions (AI)-(A6), an equilibrium exists.  It 
is unique in prices, and it is socially optimal. 
36 PROOF. Section III of the text defines the IOcial planner's problem.  Bued 
on that definition,  we  can define  the IOcial  cost minimization problem for  any 
01  ~  0, 02  ~ °to be produced by 8-type firms u: 
(8CMl)  Minimize IS [C(ql(i), 0) + 6C(92(i),ql(i))]di 
w.r.t. ns ~ O,q,  : [O,ns] -+ ~,t -1,2,q,(.) integrable w.r.t. Lebesgue measure, 
subject to the restrictions: 
IS q,(i)di ~ Oht - 1,2. 
Let 'l/J(Ob 02) be the value of the minimization problem. 
Similarly, if 0E  ~ ° is the amount to be produced by E-type firms in period 
1, then the social cost minimization problem is given by: 
(8CM2)  Minimize foRE C(qE(i), O)di 
w.r.t. nE ~ 0,9E : [O,nE] -+ ~,qE(.) integrablew.r.t. Lebesguemeuure, subject 
to the restriction: 
la rE 
qE(i)di ~ OE. 
Let 'l/JE (0E) be the value of the minimization problem. 
Lastly, if 0L  ~ °is the amount to be produced by L-type firms in period 2, 
then the social cost minimization problem is given by: 
(8CM3)  Minimize foRL 6C(qdi),0)di 
w.r.t. nL ~ O,qL  : [0, nL] -+ R+,qL(.) integrable w.r.t. Lebesgue meuure, subject 
to the restriction:  r
L
la  qL(i)di ~ OL(·) 
Let 'l/JL(0L) be the value of this minimization problem. 
First consider (SeMI). For 01 = 02 = 0,  the IOlution is obviously ns = 0. 
Suppose 02 =°and 01 > 0.  Let 
ml = min{[(C(q,O) + 6C(0,q»/q] : q ~  O}  (17) 
37 From Lemma I we have the existence of finite q >° which solves this minimization 
problem. Let q(ml) >°be any such solution. Consider the feuible let in (SeMI). 
One may without loss of generality confine attention to the subset of the feasible 
set where 'l2(i) = °a.e. and 
J:S ql(i)di - Ql. 
Let (ns, ql(i), 'l2(i» be any such feasible solution. Then 
= fos [(C(ql(i), 0) +cSC(O,ql(i»)/ql(i)]ql(i)di 
~  fons mlql(i)di 
=mlQl 
-=  [C(q(mI> ,0) + cSC(O, q(ml»]n 
where it =  Ql/q(mI>. 
Thus, there exists a solution to SCMI for Ql > 0,Q2 =°and ,p(Q.,O) = 
mlQl. 
Similarly, let m2 be defined by 
m2 =min{[(C(O, 0) + cSC(q, O»/q] : q ~  O}.  (18) 
Using Lemma I, there exists a finite positive solution to the minimization problem 
in  (18).  Consider (SCMI) for the case where Ql ==  0,Q2 > 0.  One can show by 
similar arguments as above, that there exists a solution to (SCMI) for this case 
and that 11'(0, Q2) = m2Q2· 
In fact,  the same set of arguments will  show  that there exists solution to 
(SCM2) and (SCM3) and that ,pE(QE) == PmQE and ,pLCQL) =cSpmQL. 
Lastly, consider (SCMI) for  the case where Ql > 0,Q2 > 0.  First note that 
(ns =  l,ql(i) =  Ql,q2(i) = Q2)  is a feasible solution. Let N be defined by 
Suppose there is a feasible solution (ns,ql(i),'l2(i» where ns > N. Then 
38 We  may,  therefore, without 1018  of generality confine attention to feasible 
points where ns S N. Given IB8UJIlption (AS), we may confine attention to feasible 
solutions where 9t(i) S K,i - 1,2.  Lastly, it would be wuteful to introduce an 
S-type firm which produces zero output in both periods.  So,  w.l.o.g.  one can 
confine attention to feasible points where 9t(i) > 0 for eome t, for all i e [0, ns]. 
Note that it is pOllible to extend any function 9t(i) on [0, ns] to an integrable 
function on [0, N] by setting 9t(i) - 0 for i e (ns, N]. 
Let 1(91192) - 1, if9t > 0 for eome t,9t S K for t - 1,2 and 1-0 otherwise. 
One can rewrite (SCMl) for Q1IQ2 »  0 as 
(SCMl')  Minimize foN G[91(i),C(92(i)]di 
w.r.t. 9t  : [0, N]z[O, K], 9t(.) integrable, subject to 
foN 9t(i)di ~ Qi, 
where G: Rt -+ R+ is given by 
Check that G is a bounded function on Rt (bounded above by (l+cS)C(K,O». 
A direct appeal to Theorem 6.1  in Aumann and Perles (1965) shows that there 
exists a solution to (SCMl'). This, in turn, implies that there exists a solution to 
(SCMI) for all Ql,Q2 ~ 0.12 
Let .\1  and .\2 be the Lagrangean multipliers associated with the constraints 
(*) in (SCMI).  Then at any optimal solution (ns,9}(i), 92(i» the necessary con-
ditions 
91(i) > 0 implies Cq(91(i),O) + cSC.,(92(i), 91(i» - 11(91(i),92(i» - .\1CQ1IQ2), 
(19) 
and 
12R.J.  Aumann and M.  Perles (1965)  MA Variational ProbJem Arising in Economics." 
JoumGl oJ MathematicGl AnGly.i.t and Applicatiou, 11:  488 - 603. 
39 We claim that .p(Ql,Q2) is a convex function on R~. Let us define the "cost-
possibility set" of any firm 1E ~ by 
(no-entry is equivalent to (0,0,0)) 
j(i) is  identical for  all  I.  Let F  be the  "COIt-p088ibility  let"  of the 10-
cial  planner,  i.e.  the set of all  output-cost combinations that are feasible  for 
the social  planner by using  any number of 8-type firms  and any  diltribution 
of output across  such  firms.  Thus,  F  is  the integral  of the let-valued corre-
spondence  j(i) : R+  -+  ~  with respect to Lebesgue measure.  A  direct ap-
peal to the Lyapunov-Richter theorem (see L.l.3 in A.  Maa-Colell (1985)) shows 
that F  is  a  convex set.  By definition of.p in  (SCMl), F  is also the set of all 
{(Q1,Q2,-Y):  Y  ~  .p(Ql,Q2),Q,  ~  O,t  ==  1,2}.  It is euily checked  that 
convexity of F implies that .p is a convex function on R~. 
Next, we claim that.p is continuous on R~.  Continuity on R~+ follows from 
its convexity.  Continuity on  the border can be verified directly.  For example, 
choose any sequence {Qi,Qi} -+ (Ql,Q2) such that Ql == 0,Q2 > 0.  Let q(m2) 
be a solution to the minimization problem in (l7). Then 
m2Q2'  == .p(0, Q2') ~ .p(Qi,  Q2') ~ {C([(Qiq(m2))/Q2'],0) +6C(q(m2), 
and [(Qiq(m2))/QiD}{Qi/q(m2)} -+ m2Q2  == .p(0,Q2) as m -+ +00. 
Since the left hand side of the inequality equals m2Qi -+ m2Q2  == .p(0, Q2), 
we  have  that .p(Qi,Qi) -+  .p(0.Q2).  Similar arguments can be used when the 
limits (Q1,Q2) of the sequence {Ql",Qi} are such that Q2  == O,Ql > °and also 
when both Q, == 0. 
Next we  want to establish that the partial derivatives of .p(Ql,Q2) exist on 
R~+  .  For any fixed  Q2  ==  z > 0,  let g(Q}) ==  .p(Qltz).  We will show that 9 is 
differentiable on ~+. 
Firstly, note that 9 is a convex function and so its right and left hand deriva-
tives exist.  Furthermore, 
(21) 
Let (ns, ql (i), 92(1») be the optimal solution of (SCMl) at (Qlt z). For E > °small 
enough, consider the vector (Q1 +E,Z). Let tiHi) == q1(i) +E[ql(i)/Ql]. Note that 
40 I . 
9i(i) =0 if  91(i) =O.  It is easy to check that (ns,4Hi),'l2(i» is a feasible way to 
produce (Ql + E, .z).  Thus, 
g(Ql + E) =.p(Ql + E,.z) S 1;/1 [f(91(i),q2(i))]di 
- 1 0 '"[f([91(i) +E(91(i)/Ql)],'l2(i»di 
80 that 
Urn  -=  I~O  {(g(Ql + E) - g(Ql)]/E}￿ 
S!~  (l/E) 10'"  {f([91 (i) +E(91 (i)/Ql)], 'l2(i»￿ 
(Use the dominated convergence theorem and note that in the last expression the 
term within curly brackets equals zero if 91 (i) -= 0.) 
g~(Qd =  !~  (l/E) fo"S {f([91 (i) +E(91 (i)/QIl],'l2(i» - f(91(i),'l2(i»}I(i)di 
where l(i) = 1 if 91 (i) > 0 and l(i) =0 otherwise. 
Since f(91,92) is differentiable and further using (19), we have from the above 
inequality that: 
g~(Qd S los !I(ql(i), 'l2(i»)[ql(i)/Qdl(i)di 
= lonsU~dQl,.z)]/QIl91(i)di  (u.ing(19»  (22) 
="\I(Ql,.z). 
By a similar argument one can show that: 
g~(Qd  =~~  (g(QIl-g(Ql - E)](l/E)  ~ "\1(Ql, .z).  (23) 
Thus (22) and (23) imply 
which combined with (21) yields 
9~(Ql) =g~(QIl ="\1, 
that is, 9 is differentiable at Ql and 
(24) 
41 Note that at Q2 =0, 1/1(QhQ2) =mlQl so that  1/11 (Ql, 0) =ml. Similarreuoning 
shows that given Ql ~ 0, the partial derivative of 1/1  w.r.t. Q2 exists on ~+ and 
is given by 
~(Ql,Q2) =~2(Q},Q2) 
and, in particular, ~(O, Q2) =m2. 
As the partial derivatives of  1/1 exist at each point in R~+ and 1/1  is convex, it 
follows that 1/1  is continuously differentiable on R~+  (Section 42, Theorem D and 
Section 44, Theorem E in Roberts and Varberg [1973]). 
We summarize the above discussion in the Lemma 11: 
Lemma 11:  (a) There exists a solution to the (SCMl), (SCM2) and (SCM3). 
(b) For any QE  ~ O,1/1E(QE) = PmQE and in the solution to (SCM2), qE(i) E 
{q: [C(q,O)jq] =Pm} 
(c) For any QL  ~  0, ,pdQL) = OPmQL and in the solution to (SCM3), qLCi) E 
{q: [C(q,O)jq] = Pm}. 
(d)  For Ql = O,,p(Ql,O)  = mlQl  where ml  > 0 is  defined  by  (17);  For 
Q2  ~  0, ,p(O, Q2) = m2Q2, where m2  is defined by (18). 
(e),p  is continuous and convex on R;; 
(C) For any (Ql, Q2)  ~  0, there exists Lagrangean multipliers ~1 (Ql, Q2), ~2(Q}, Q2), 
such that the solution (ns, ql (i), q2(i)) to (SCMl) is characterized by (19) and (20). 
(g)  ,p  is  continuously differentiable on  R;+ and its partial derivatives are 
given by ,pt(Ql, Q2) = ).t(Ql, Q2), t = 1,2; further, 1/1lCQ1, 0) = ml and 1/12(0, Q2) = 
m2· 
We  now  rewrite (SPP*) as the following  problem (hereafter referred to as 
SPP) 
where 
W(Ql, Q2, QE, QLl = {S(Ql+QE )+oS(Q2+QLl-1/1(Ql, Q2)-1/1E(QE)-1/1L(QL)}, 
and S(y) = IK P(q)dq. 
42 1·---
Note that S  is a strictly concave function, continuous on R;., continuously 
dift'erentiable on R;.+ aDd S'(l') - P(l')' 
Thus, using Lemma 11, W ia continuous aDd strictly cOncave on Rt. Further, 
at any point (Ql > 0,Q2 > O,QE  ~  O,QL  ~  0), the partial derivatives ofW w.r.t 
all wguments exist.  In particular, 
8W/8Ql == P(Ql +QE) - ,pl(Ql,Q2) - P(Ql +QE) - Al(Ql,Q2)  (25) 
8W/8Q2 - P(Q2 +QL) - t/I2(Ql,Q2) - P(Q2 +QL) - A2(Ql,Q2)  (26) 
8W/aQE - P(Ql +QE) - ,pE(QE) - P(Ql +QE) - Pm  (27) 
8W/8QL - 6P(Q2 +QL) - ,pI'<QL) .1(P(Q2 +QL) - Pm].  (28) 
Since P(II)  ~ 0 as  11  ~  +00 and Pm  > 0,  there exists Qo  > 0,  such that 
IJW/IJQE  < 0 for  any (QJ,Q2,QE,QL)  where QE  > Qo aDd 8W/8QL  < 0 for 
QL  > Qo.  Note that A2(QJ,Q2) = C,('l2(i),ql(i»  ~  min{C,(q,%):  0  ~  q  ~ 
K, 0  ~  w  S  K}.  Using  (AI)  we  can check  that the minimum in the previous 
expression is  actually attained at IOme  (q", wIt)  e (0, K)  x (0, K).  Thus, for  all 
(QJ,Q2) such that Q2  > 0,  we  have t/I2(QttQ2)  ~  C,(q",h") ==  h where, using 
(A2), we have h > O.  So, there exists QI > 0 such that 8W/8Q2 < 0 for Q2  ~ QI 
. Let Q=m4%(QI,QO)'  One can without 1088 of generality, rewrite SPP as 
Ma%imize 
QI~O.Q2.QI:,QLE[O,~l  W(Ql, Q2, QE, QL) 
We claim there exists a solution to this maximization problem. Let W. be the 
supremum of the maximand (which can be +00). _Then, there exists a sequence 
{Qi,Q2,QE,Qi},m =  1,2,..., where W(Qi,Qi',QE,Qi)  ~  W·.  Suppose 
{Qi} is bounded above.  Then the sequence {Qi,Q2,QE'Qi} is bounded above 
and has a convergent subsequence, whose limit is the optimallOlution, using con-
tinuity of W. 
Now suppose that {Qi} is not bounded above; abusing notation IOmewhat, 
suppose that {Qi} ~ +00. Choose M such that Qt' > o.  Then for m ~  M, 
,p!CQi,Q2') ~ ,pI(Qt',Q2') ~ inf{,pl(Qt',%): 0 ~  % S K} ==  ~(.al'). 
Let f(%) =,pI (Qt',%).  There exists a sequence {%.} e (O,K), such that f(%.) ~ 
~.  We  claim that ~  > O.  To  see  this, consider a  convergent  subsequence of 
{%k},  e.g.  {.z~}  ~  %..  If %.  > 0,  then from  continuous differentiability of ,p 
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-1---(implying continuity of partial derivatives) on R~+, we have that /(z,,) -+ /(z.) = 
1/Il(Or,Z.) == .\1(Or,Z.) > 0.  Suppose z. - 0.  Note that 1/Il(0t',0) - ml.  For 
E > 0, 1/11 (Or,E)  ~  [1/1(Ot',E) -1/1(0,E)]/Ot' (using convexity of  1/1) so that taking 
the limit 88 E -+°(using the continuity of  1/1  on R~ and the fact that 1/1(0,0) - 0) 
yields:￿ 
lim  M  M M￿ '-+01/11(01  ,E) ~ 1/1(01  ,0)/01  - ml 
lim 
so that k'-++oo /(z~)  11: tJ. > 0. 
Since O'{' -+ +00 , there exists M' > °such that for m  ~  M', P(O'{') < tJ.. 
Thus, for  m  ~  maz(M,M'),P(O'E + O'{')  < 1/Il(0'{',0;')  i.e.  8W/8Ql  < ° 
when evaluated at m large enough. This is a contradiction. Thus, {O'{'} must be 
bounded above.  The proof of existence is complete. 
Note that since W is strictly concave on Rt, the solution to (SPP) is unique. 
It is easy to check that assumption (A6)  implies P(O)  > 1/1£(0)  ==  Pm  and 
6P(O) > 1/11.(0) =6pm which, in turn, is sufficient to assert that if(Olt02,OE,OL) 
solves (SPP) then 01 +OE > ° and 02+0L > 0.  FUrther, it is impossible that in 
the optimal solution Or  == ° for either t == 1 or t == 2 or both. Suppose 01 - ° and 
Q2 > O.  Now,  consider the original form of the social planner's problem (Spp·). 
Since 01 +0E > 0, it must be true that 0 E > 0.  Then the social planner can easily 
reduce total cost by letting the existing ns firms of type S (who currently produce 
zero in period 1) produce a total amount 01  == OE  (setting nE == 0).  The cost in 
/',  period 1 is unchanged and that in period 2 is reduced (using assumption (A2», a 
contradiction.  Similarly, 01  > 0,02  11: °is ruled out 88 this implies 0 L >°and 
total cost can be reduced by letting S-type firms (who currently produce nothing 
in period 2)  produce a total amount 02 = OL  (setting nL ==  0).  Lastly, if both 
Ot  are equal to zero, then 0 E > 0,0L > 0.  Suppose we let E be the measure of 
E-type firms that produce in period 2- i.e.  convert them to 8-type firms, reduce 
the number of L-type firms by E and transfer their output to these E 8-type firms. 
Then it is easy to see that total costs are reduced, a contradiction. To summarize: 
Lemma Ill: There exists a solution to SPP and, hence, (SPP·). The solution 
to the social planner's problem is unique in (01,02,OE,OL). If  (Oi, 0;,  Oe,OiJ 
is an optimal solution in total output produced by different "types" of firms then 
Oi > 0, Oi > 0. 






to be an optimal solution to (SPP) 
P(Qi +QE) - tPl(Qi,Qi)[- ~1(Qi,Qi)] S tPE(QE)[- Pm]  (29)￿ 
P(Qi +QE) - Pm  if QE >°  (30)￿ 
6P(Qi + Ql> = tP2(Qi,Qi)[= ~2(Qi,Q;)] S tPt(Ql)[= 6Pm]  (31)￿ 
P(Qi +Ql) - Pm  if Ql >°  (32)￿ 
Definepi = P(Qi+QE)'P; = P(Q;+Q£}. Let (nj,ni:,nl,9i(i),q2(i),9i:(i),9£(i» 
be the solutions to (SCMl), (SCM2), and (SCM3)  UIOciated with (Qi,Qi),Qi: 
and Ql respectively. 
We want to show that [pi,Pi,nj, ni:, nl, (9i(i), q2(i), °Si  S nj), (9i:(i),° S 
i  S  nE' (9i.(i),0 S i S  n£}]  constitutes an equilibrium.  Recall  the conditions 
(i)-(xi) that define an equilibrium.  By definition of the prices, conditions (i) and 
(ii) in the definition of equilibrium are satisfied. From (29) and (30) we have that 
pi S Pm,P;  S  Pm  which  implies conditions  (vii)  and (viii)  of the definition of 
equilibrium are satisfied. Ifni: > 0, then it must be the case that Qi: >°so that 
(30)  implies pi = Pm  and from  Lemma lI(b) we  have that 9E(i) maximizes one 
period profit at price Pm  and the maximum profit is equal to 0.  Thus, conditions 
(iv) and (x) ofthe definition ofequilibrium are satisfied. Similarly (32) andLemma 
II(c) imply that conditions (v)  and (xi) are met.  Since ns,Qi,Qi »  0,  it just 
remains to show that conditions (iii) and (ix) are satisfied (condition (vi) then holds 
automatically). In other words, we need to show that (9i(i),9;(i» maximizes two 
period discounted sum of profits at prices (Pi, Pi) and that this maximum ill equal 
to O. 
Consider  (SCMI)  at (Qi,Qi) »0.  From' (29)  and  (31)  we  have  that 
~1CQi,(2) = pi,~2(Qi,Qi)  = pi·  Then  (~1  = pi,~2  = Pi,9i(i),9i(i),ns) mini-
mizes the Lagrangean function: 
L = l"s f(91(i), 92(i»di +  ~1 (Ql -l"s 91 (i)di) +  ~2(Q2 - J:L 92(i)di) 
with respect to ns  ~  O,~j  ~  0,91  : [O,ns]  -+  ~,92  :  [O,ns]  -+  ~,9t(.)  inte-
grable. 
Then it must, in particular, be true that given  (~1  = pi,  ~2 = pi), the vector 
(ns, 9i(i), 9i(i» maximizes: 
J:s [Pi91 (i) +P292(i) -f(91(i),92(i»]di 
45 with respect to ns  ~ O,ql  : [O,ns]  -+  ~,92  : [O,ns]  -+ ~,qt(.)  integrable.  But 
this implies that (almost everywhere) 
(a) (qi(i),q2(i)) maximizes [Piql+P292-/(ql,92)] with respect to (ql,92)  ~ 0, 
and 
Proof of (a) is obvious  (for otherwise we  could increase the maximud by 
choosing a different value for (ql (i), 92(i)) on a positive meuure of 6rma.  To see 
(b), suppose not. There are two p088ibilities: 
(1)  [Piql(i) + Pi92(i) -/(ql(i),92(i))] < 0 in which case  the maximand is 
increased by simply eliminating a  positive meuure of such firms  (reducing ns 
below ns), a contradiction; 
(2)  lPiql(i) + piq2(i) -/(ql(i),92(i))] > 0 in which case the maximand can 
be increased to +00 by setting ns = +00 and letting all j  ~ ns produce the same 
output vector (ql (i), q2(i)), a contradiction as ns < 00 • 
This proves (b).  (a) and (b) imply that conditions (iii) and (ix) in the defi-
nition of equilibrium hold. We have therefore proved that: 
Lemma IVi Every solution to the social planner's problem is implementable 
as a competitive equilibrium. In particular, let (ns, ni:, ni,qi(i),q2(i), qECi), qi(i)) 
be a solution to (SPP*) with associated total output (Qi,Qi,Qi:,QV. Then, if 
pi =P(Qi + Qi:),pi =P(Qi + QV, then lPi,pi,ns,ni:,ni, (qi(i), qi(i),0 S i S 
ns), (qi:(i), 0 S i S ni:, (qi(i),O S i S nV] is a cos:opetitive equilibrium. 
Lemmas III and IV imply: 
Lemma Vi  There exists an equilibrium. 
Next,  we  show  that every  equilibrium is  socially optimal.  Let  [p!,p~,n~, 
nt,nl,(ql'(i),q~(i),O S i S  ns),(qt(i),O S  i  S  nt),(ql(i),O S  i  S  nl)] be 
a  equilibrium.  Let  (Q!,Q~)  be total  output produced by 8-type firms  in this 
equilibrium.  From Lemma III, we have that Qf > 0, Q~  > O.  Let Qt and Ql be 
the total quantity produced by E and L type firms in their period of stay. 
Our first claim is that (n~,ql'(i),q~(i))is a socially cost minimizing way of 
producing (Qf, Q~)  i.e.  it solves (SeMI) given (Q!,  Q~).  Suppose not. Then there 
46 exists (n,fil(i),th(i»  which solves (SCMl) given (Qf,QI) and  , 
1/1(Qf,QI) < J:s /(911(i),9'(i))di.  (33) 
The sum of total profits of all S type firms in equilibrium i8 zero.  Therefore,  , 
0= l:
S lPf911(i) + 6pI9'(i) -/(911(i),9~(i))]di  < pfQ! + 6p~Q~ - 1/1(Qf,Q~)  (unng  (33» 
=Ion lPf91(i) + 6plth(i) -/(91(i),fJ(i))]di 
which implies, in turn, that there exists some i for which lPf91(i) +  6p~th(i)  -
/(91(i),92(i»] > O.  But by definition of equilibrium, the maximum poesible dis-
counted sum of profit at prices  (pf,p~)  is O.  We have a contradiction. Hence, 
".' (Qf,Q~) =J  S /(911(i),9'(i»di  (34) 
o 
and (n~, 91 1(i),  q~(i»  does solve (SCMI) given (Qf, QI). 
Next, suppose nl > O.  Then from Proposition 1, pf 11: Pm  and 91(i) e {q  ~ 
o: [C(q,O)/q]  = Pm}  which means that total cost of production of Q~ is equal 
to PmQ~ which  is  equal to  1PE(Q~), i.e.  (n~,qS(i))  solves  (SCM2)  given Qi. 
Similarly, one can show that if n1 > 0, then (n1,9L(i)) solves (SCM3) given QL . 
Therefore, in equilibrium, total output (Qf,QI,Q~,Q1> produced by difl'er-
ent types of finns are produced in the socially cost minimizing way.  Let the total 
social welfare in equilibrium is equal to W(Qf'Ql, Q~, Q1), where the function W 
is as defined before introducing problem (SPP). As noted earlier, W(.) is strictly 
concave on Rt.  The partial derivatives of W exist at all  (Ql,Q2,QE,QL)  ~  0, 
where Ql > 0, Q2 > O. 
Suppose equilibrium is not socially optimal.  Let (Qi, Qi, Qi:, Ql) maximize 
social welfare. Then, 
W(Qf,Q~,Q~,Q1)- W(Qi, Qi,Qi:, QiJ < O.  (35) 
From Lemma UI,  Qi > 0, Q; > O.  As  noted above, Qf > 0,  Q~  > O.  So strict 
concavity of W  implies 
W(Qf,Q~,Q~,QP - W(Qi,Qi,QE,QiJ 
~  [8W(Qf,Q~,QE,Q1)/aQl][Qf - Qil 
+[8W(Qf,QI,Qf,Qt)/aQ2][Q~  - Qi]  (36) 
+[8W(Qf,Qi'Qf'  Qt)/aQE][Qi: - Qi:] 
+[8W(Qf,Q2,QE,QL)/8QL][QL - Ql]. 
47 Note that: 
8W(Qf,Q~,Q~,Ql)/8Ql-= p(Qf  +Q~) -"I(Qf,Q~) - pI- ~l(Qf,Q~)  (37) 
- pI- !l(911(i), q~(i»  (from  (19».  (38) 
As Qf > 0, Q~  > 0, there exists positive measure ofi such that 91 1(i) > 0, q: (i) > 0, 
so that the first order conditions ofproflt maximization (condition (iii) in definition 
of equilibrium) implies that right hand side of (37) is equal to zero, i.e. 
8W(Qf,Q~,Q~,Ql)/8Ql  - o.  (39) 
Similarly, one can show that 
8W(Qf,Q~.Qt,Ql)/8Q2 -= O.  (40) 
Next note that, from Proposition 1, pf S Pm  SO that 8W(~f,Q~,Q~,Ql)/8QE-= 
PI  - t/JE(Q~)  -= PI - Pm  S 0 and it is equal to zero if QE > 0 (since pf - Pm). 
Thus, 
[8W(Qf,Q~,Q~,Ql)/8QE][Q~ - Qi;]  ~  O.  (41) 
Similarly, one can show that 
[8W(Qf,Q~,Q~,Ql)/8QL][Ql- Ql] ~  O.  (42) 
From  (36)  ,  (39)  - (42)  we  have  W(Qf,Q~,Q~,Ql)  - W(Qi,Q2,Qi;,Ql)  ~  0 
contradicting (35)  . The proof is complete.  We have thus shown: 
.  Lemma VI:  Every competitive equilibrium is socially optimal. 
Combining Lemmas (Ill) - (VI) yields Proposition 2. 
PROPOSITION 3.  Under assumptions (AI)-(A7), an equilibrium exists.  It 
is unique in prices, output, and number of firms, and it is socially optimal. 
Proof.  It is sufficient to show that under (A7) there exists a unique solution 
to (SCMI),  (SCM2)  and  (SCM3).  Proposition 2 then implies  the result.  To 
see uniqueness in (SCMI) let (ns,ql(i),92(i»,(n',qHi),th(i» be any two optimal 
production plans  producing (Ql,Q2)  »0.  Let N  - maz(ns,n').  Suppose 
ns  < n'.  Then extend qt(i)  to the entire interval [O,n']  by setting qt(i) - 0 for 
i > ns.  Then let qt(i) =(l/2)[qt(i) +r,(i)], t =1,2 be defined on [0, n'].  It is easy 
to check that this is a feasible production plan for (Ql,Q2).  Further, 
loft' [f(tf1(i),tf2(i»]di < loft' (l/2)[f(ql(i),92(i» +  f(qHi),q~(i))]di  -= .,(QllQ2), 
48 
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a contradiction. Uniqueness in (SCM2) and (SCM3) are similarly established. / / 
PROPOSITION 4.  Under usumptions (Al)-(A7), the following  is true in 
equilibrium: 
(a)  Each￿ of the staying firms behaves identically,  and there exists a  positive 
measure of staying firms.  There exist 9i and 9i such that 9i(i) - 9i and 
9i (i) = 9i for all active staying firms i. 
(b)￿  If exiting firms exist, they produce at the initial minimum efficient scale, 
which is  less than the 91  produced by the staying firms.  If  nE > 0, then 
9E(i) =9m for all i e [0, nE], where 9m is the unique solution to minimization 
of [0(9,0)/9] with respect to 9 ~ 0, and 9E < 9i. 
(c)  There exist no late-entering firms:  nL - O. 
Proof.  The first part of (a) and (b) follow immediately from strict concavity of 
the profit function for each type of firm.  (Note that since the total amount (Qll Q2) 
produced by all S-type firms is always strictly positive, (9i,9i) »0.) The second 
part of (b) results from Proposition 1, because the negative first-period profits of 
the staying firms  result from  their high production for  the sake of learning.  It 
remains to show that nL =0 for part (c). 
Suppose that nL  > O.  Then from  Lemma 11,  nE =0 and P2 =Pm.  Under 
(A7), there exists a unique 9m  which minimizes [0(9,0)/9] over 9 ~  O.  So, 9L<i) = 
9m  and 
(43) 
Furthermore, 
D<P2) =D(pm) = nS92 +nL9m > nS92'￿  (44) 
From first order condition of profit maximization for firms which produce in both 
periods we  have that C,(9i,qj) =P2 = Pm  and, therefore (using (A7),  (43)  and 
qi > 0) 
92  ~  qm.￿  (45) 
Next we claim that the following inequality is true: 
0.,(qi,9i)qi +0,(92,9i)q2 - 0(Q2,9j) ~ O.￿  (46) 
By convexity of 0  on R~, 
49 which implies that C.,(q;, qi)qi+C,(q;, qi)q;-C(q;, qi) ~ C,(q;, qi)qm-C(qm, 0) = 
P2qm - C(qm, 0) -lP2 - (C(qm, O)/qm)] =0 (using (43) ). 
From the first order conditions of profit maximizatioJl for 8-type firms and 
the fact that in equilibrium, the di8counted IU1I1 of profits·is zero, we have: 
Cf(qi,O)qi +6C.,(q;, qi)qi +IC,(q;, qi)q; - C(qi, 0) -IC(q;,qi) -= O. 
Using (46) in the above equation we have: 
Cf(qi,O)qi - C(qi, 0) SO 
which implies that 
qi S qm 
so that, from (45) , we have qi S q;.  Thus, 
(47) 
(48) 
From (44) and (48) we have 
and so, PI > 1'2 =Pm  , which violates condition (vii) of the definition of equilib-
rium. / / 
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